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9	SUPERIOR COURT OF T	THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA			
10	COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO				
11					
12	CHINO BASIN MUNICIPAL WATER	Case No. RCV 51010			
13	DISTRICT,	Assigned for All Purposes to the Honorable Stanford E. Reichert			
14	Plaintiff,				
15	V.	THE APPROPRIATIVE POOL'S OPPOSITION TO THE MOTION BY THE			
16	CITY OF CHINO, et al.,	OVERLYING (NON-AGRICULTURAL) POOL COMMITTEE FOR COURT			
17	Defendants.	REVIEW OF WATERMASTER ACTIONS PURSUANT TO SECTION 31 OF JUDGMENT			
18 19		[Filed Concurrently With The Declaration of Robert A. DeLoach]			
20		Date: May 14, 2010			
21		Time: 10:30 a.m. Dept: C-1			
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	OPPOSITION TO THE MOTION BY THE OVERLYING (NON WATERMASTER ACTIONS PURS	N-AGRICULTURAL) POOL COMMITTEE FOR COURT REVIEW OF SUANT TO SECTION 31 OF JUDGMENT			

LAW OFFICES OF BEST BEST & KRIEGER LLP OO SOUTH GRAND AVENUE, 28TH FLOOR LOS ANGELES, CA 90071

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The Appropriative Pool hereby submits the following Opposition to the Motion by the Overlying (Non-Agricultural) Pool Committee ("Non-Ag Pool") for Court Review of Watermaster Actions Pursuant to Section 31 of Judgment (hereinafter, "Paragraph 31 Motion" or "Motion").

I. INTRODUCTION

The Motion filed by the Non-Ag Pool is without merit. As detailed in the Watermaster Opposition, Notice of Intent to Purchase ("Notice") was properly provided consistent with the terms of the Purchase and Sale Agreement ("Agreement") that the Non-Ag Pool entered into as part of the Peace II Measures ("Peace II"). The Non-Ag Pool seeks to invalidate certain portions of the Agreement for no reason other than it desires a "do over" for the purpose of reaping additional substantial pecuniary benefit. The Motion is borne of greed and seeks to force the Appropriative Pool to purchase otherwise stranded water at a price several million dollars higher than the amount voluntarily negotiated by the Non-Ag Pool under the terms of the Agreement.

The Non-Ag Pool Motion is heavy on rhetoric, but light on the law. The accusatory tone of the Motion, combined with lack of legal authority, non-contextual and selective use of irrelevant facts, sweeping generalizations, and numerous inaccuracies, attempts to deflect attention away from the lack of credible legal or factual support for the Motion. The Non-Ag Pool is asking the Court to overlook the plain language of the Agreement, the context of the formation of the Agreement, the course of conduct between the parties, and the equities, all in favor of defective and unarticulated legal theories.

It appears the Non-Ag Pool has filed the Motion out of seller's remorse, and because it has nothing to lose. If the Non-Ag Pool prevails, it will have the opportunity to sell the water at a higher price. If it loses, it will have already sold the water for the negotiated price, thereby

¹ On April 12, 2010, the Chino Basin Watermaster submitted an Opposition to Paragraph 31 Motion, and supporting documents ("Watermaster Opposition"). The Appropriative Pool hereby joins in the Watermaster Opposition and adopts as if fully stated herein all points and authorities in support thereof. Joinder is appropriate since the opposition has merit and the Appropriative Pool is affected as a third party beneficiary by the Non-Agricultural Pool's claims and allegations against Watermaster.

earning a significant profit to which it otherwise would not be entitled. Unfortunately, the Motion may have long-ranging and unintended ramifications by putting at risk portions of the heavily negotiated Peace II package, which will have long-term negative consequences for all parties to the Judgment.

While the Non-Ag Pool may be smaller in number than the Appropriative Pool, their self-characterization as beleaguered and downtrodden, with little or no resources, is inaccurate and disingenuous. The Non-Ag Pool's Motion can be summed up in one word: greed. Non-Ag Pool members, which are comprised largely of private companies, stand to gain millions of dollars from the Agreement, but apparently they believe it is not enough. Now, they seek millions more for their own private gain – millions that will ultimately be paid by the public. The Motion does not seek to improve either Basin management or Watermaster administration of the Judgment. The sole focus of the Motion, and the sole remedy it seeks, is the ability to sell water at a higher price.

Because the Notice was in fact provided by Watermaster consistent with the terms of the Agreement and in conformity with the Watermaster Rules and Regulations as well as long-standing practice and standards, the Appropriative Pool requests that the Court summarily deny the Non-Ag Pool's Motion in full.

II. BACKGROUND FACTS

A. UNDER GENERAL WATER LAW PRINCIPLES, THE NON-AG POOL WATER CANNOT BE STORED OR TRANSFERRED

California Constitution, Article X, Section 2, specifies that water be put to reasonable and beneficial use and that waste and unreasonable use be prevented.² The right of an overlying water producer to take water is based on ownership of the land and is appurtenant thereto. (*Pasadena v.*

² "It is hereby declared that because of the conditions prevailing in this State the general welfare requires that the water resources of the State be put to beneficial use to the fullest extent of which they are capable, and that the waste or unreasonable use or unreasonable method of use of water be prevented, and that the conservation of such waters is to be exercised with a view to the reasonable and beneficial use thereof in the interest of the people and for the public welfare. The right to water or to the use or flow of water in or from any natural stream or water course in this State is and shall be limited to such water as shall be reasonably required for the beneficial use to be served, and such right does not and shall not extend to the waste or unreasonable use or unreasonable method of use or unreasonable method of diversion of water. " (Cal. Const., Art. X, sec. 2.)

Alhambra (1949) 33 Cal. 2d 908, 925.) Water is a usufructuary (use) right. An overlying owner having a legal right to groundwater "may take only such amount as he reasonably needs for beneficial purposes." (*Ibid.*) Under general water law principles, a holder of a riparian or overlying right may not transfer its water right away from the land or use such water right to accumulate water in storage. (See *Moore v. California Oregon Power Co.* (1943) 22 Cal. 2d 725, 731; *Tehachapi-Cummings County Water Dist. v. Armstrong* (1975) 49 Cal. App. 3d 992, 1002.) As detailed below, under these common law principles, the overlying rights that are appurtenant to the Non-Ag Pool members' property would not be transferable and could not be used to accumulate water in storage.

B. THE CHINO BASIN JUDGMENT & GOVERNANCE

The Judgment in this matter was entered in 1978 and created several layers of governance, including the various pool committees, an advisory committee, and a Watermaster. (Watermaster Exhibit No. 3 – Judgment, pp. 12-22 & 24-26.) The pool committees include the Appropriative Pool, the Overlying (Agricultural) Pool ("Agricultural Pool"), and the Non-Ag Pool. Operation of each Pool and the rights of water producers within each Pool are controlled by each Pool's own pooling plan.

The Appropriative Pool is made up almost entirely of public agencies and other not-for-profit entities. (Declaration of Robert A. DeLoach ["DeLoach Decl."], ¶ 5.) These entities answer to their ratepayers and exist solely for the purpose of providing a public service. (*Ibid.*) Other than the City of Ontario and San Bernardino County, the members of the Non-Ag Pool consist largely of for-profit, private companies. (*Id.* at ¶ 6.) The Advisory Committee contains representatives from each respective Pool, including the Non-Ag Pool, and was created to oversee and "advise" the Watermaster. (Watermaster Exhibit No. 3 – Judgment, ¶ 38.)

Although Chino Basin Municipal Water District ("CBMWD") was originally appointed the Watermaster in 1978, the court replaced CBMWD in 1998 with a stakeholder-driven ninemember Board. The nine-member Board includes one representative from the Non-Ag Pool, two representatives from the Agricultural Pool, three representatives from the non-producing

municipal water districts, and three representatives from the Appropriative Pool. (Watermaster Exhibit No. 16 - February 18, 1998 Order, p. 3:16-20.)

The current stakeholder-driven structure is a unique system of self-governance that not only permits, but requires good-faith participation by each of the three Pools and its members. It is perhaps understandable that the private companies that largely compose the Non-Ag Pool do not fully appreciate the responsibilities that fall upon them as participants in a process of self-governance. Indeed, the approach of the entire Paragraph 31 Motion, which characterizes the Agreement as a simple purchase and sale between parties otherwise unrelated to one another, betrays an attitude of separateness of the members of the Non-Ag Pool from the process of which they are actually an integral part. Watermaster is composed of the parties to the Judgment; the Non-Ag Pool is one leg of a three-legged stool. Unfortunately, the Paragraph 31 Motion presupposes that the Non-Ag Pool is not an active participant in this process and has no responsibilities to the successful functioning of the Watermaster. It therefore constitutes a rejection by the Non-Ag Pool of its place within this process.

C. THE NON-AG POOL'S RIGHT TO TRANSFER WATER OUTSIDE OF ITS POOL AND TO NON-OVERLYING USE ORIGINATES FROM PEACE II NEGOTIATIONS

1. The Non-Ag Pool Originally Had No Right to Sell Water Outside Its Pool

Consistent with the California Constitutional principles set forth above, the 1978

Judgment did not allow the Non-Ag Pool to transfer water from the land on which the water was used. The "overlying" nature of the rights limited its use. (See Watermaster Exhibit No. 3 – Judgment, Exhibit "G" attached thereto.) The 1978 Judgment, however, allowed the Non-Ag Pool to store water indefinitely in the Basin. (*Ibid.*) Over time, and as Non-Ag rights became increasingly under-utilized, its water began to accumulate in local storage accounts of use only to that Pool. By July 2007, more than 52,000 acre-feet of water had accumulated in storage. (Watermaster Opposition at p. 4.)

Because the Non-Ag Pool's stored water was not put to beneficial use for a number of years, many parties to the Judgment believed that unused, and thus surplus Non-Ag Pool water,

should be re-allocated and placed to beneficial use within the Basin without compensation to the Non-Ag Pool, consistent with the method utilized for surplus Agricultural Pool water. (DeLoach Decl., ¶ 7.) During the negotiation of the Peace Agreement in 2000, the parties consented to a limited "transfer" provision that allowed the Non-Ag Pool to transfer water to Watermaster for purposes of desalter replenishment, or for use in a storage and recovery program, subject to demonstration of broad mutual benefit. (Watermaster Exhibit No. 5, Section 5.3(e); DeLoach Decl., ¶ 8.) Given the limited nature of these transfers, between 2000 and the beginning of the Peace II negotiations, the Non-Ag Pool did not avail itself of the ability to transfer water pursuant to these provisions.

2. The Bargained For Exchange of the Agreement and Peace II Conveyed a New Right to The Non-Ag Pool.

The Agreement was negotiated as part of the suite of documents commonly referred to as the "Peace II" package or the "Peace II Measures." (See Watermaster Exhibit Nos. 1 & 7.) The Peace II negotiations took place over a period of years, from roughly 2004 to 2007. (DeLoach Decl., ¶ 9.)

As during the Peace negotiations, the overwhelming opinion of parties during the Peace II negotiations was that allowing Non-Ag Pool's water to accumulate, unused, in the Non-Ag Pool storage accounts was a violation of Article X, Section 2 of the California Constitution, because the water was not put to maximum reasonable and beneficial use. (*Id.* at ¶ 10.) The argument was again raised that, consistent with California water law, unused water should revert to the common pool and be placed to reasonable and beneficial use within the Basin without compensation to the Non-Ag Pool, consistent with the method utilized for surplus Agricultural Pool water. (*Id.* at ¶ 11.)

The Non-Ag Pool, through its sole representative during the Peace II negotiations, Bob Bowcock, advanced the idea of selling the Non-Ag Pool's water and further enhancing the Non-Ag Pool's ability to transfer water outside the Pool for compensation. (*Id.* at ¶ 12.) Mr. Bowcock engineered and advocated a plan by which the Appropriative Pool would be able to purchase the water in storage at "market price," that is to say, the same price that Appropriative

Pool parties would sell or lease water as between each other. (*Id.* at ¶ 13.) This price was widely recognized to be 92% of the then-current replenishment rate established by the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California ("MWD"). (*Id.* at ¶ 14.) Because Watermaster typically purchases imported water from MWD, the MWD rate is used as the benchmark for purposes of valuing other purchased or leased water supplies available within or to the Chino Groundwater Basin. (*Id.* at ¶ 15.)

In exchange for the ability to sell the water in storage to the Appropriative Pool at market price, the Non-Ag Pool agreed to dedicate 10 percent of the water to desalter replenishment. (*Id.* at ¶ 16; see also, Watermaster Exhibit Nos. 1 & 8.) Consistent with this approach, the parties executed the Agreement. (See Watermaster Exhibit No. 1.) The parties also negotiated a mechanism whereby the Non-Ag Pool could elect, on an annual basis, to make unused water available for purchase by the Appropriative Pool at market price. (DeLoach Decl., ¶ 17; see also, Watermaster Exhibit No. 8.) The ability to engage in an annual and ongoing transfer required a Judgment Amendment, which was also included as part of the Peace II package. (Watermaster Exhibit No. 8.)

D. THE AGREEMENT

Because the Appropriative Pool needed time to consider whether to buy the full amount of the water in storage, as well as time to consider how best to pay for the water and the uses to which the water would be placed, Section C of the Agreement contained a condition that required Watermaster to provide written notice of intent to purchase the water within a specified period of time. (Watermaster Exhibit No. 1.)

Section H of the Agreement provided for "Early Termination" of the contract in the event the condition was not satisfied. Pursuant to Section H, if Watermaster did not issue the Notice within the specified time period, the Non-Ag Pool members could then elect to make the stored water available to individual members of the Appropriative Pool at a different (and higher) price, consistent with the new Judgment Amendment allowing annual transfers. (*Ibid.*)

The Agreement was structured so that the parties would be bound by certain mutual obligations and benefits at the time the Agreement was executed in 2007: the Non-Ag pool was

conferred a benefit insofar as it had the ability to transfer both water in storage and unused water on an annual basis, for a set price, to members of the Appropriative Pool. Although the Non-Ag Pool was not obligated to offer water on an ongoing basis, the Non-Ag Pool benefited from the opportunity to do so, and the Appropriative Pool benefited from the ability to buy water in storage for a fixed price, including escalating payments, and also to purchase unused water made available on an ongoing basis by the Non-Ag Pool for a fixed price. (See Watermaster Exhibit No. 8.)

The Agreement also contained a one-time transfer of water between Vulcan Materials,
San Antonio Water Company, and Cucamonga Valley Water District. That portion of the
Agreement was fully performed in 2007 and 2008 without any objection. (DeLoach Decl., ¶ 18.)

Effectively, the import of the Agreement as a whole was to convert valueless and unmarketable water into a valuable asset for the Non-Ag Pool. For this reason, the obvious profiteering motive of the Non-Ag Pool's Motion is particularly egregious to the Appropriative Pool. Considering the difficult and protracted debates and negotiations antecedent to the denouement of Peace II, a different result could have been reached, and the Non-Ag Pool's stored water could have remained stranded or been permitted to revert to the Basin without compensation to the Pool. The Non-Ag Pool's motion curiously and perilously ignores the chilling effect that the Non-Ag Pool's attempt to circumvent the sale under bargained-for terms could have on the future relationship between the Non-Ag and Appropriative Pools, and the Pools' willingness to cooperate on future mutually beneficial water transaction opportunities.

E. BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE OF THE AUCTION

In 2008 and 2009, it became clear to the Appropriative Pool that ongoing drought conditions and regulatory restrictions on water exports from the Sacramento-San Joaquin Bay Delta, which is a primary MWD supply source, meant that the ability to obtain replenishment water from MWD would be severely limited. (DeLoach Decl., ¶ 22.) In particular, because MWD projected that replenishment water would be available in only 3 out of 10 years (as opposed to 7 out of 10 years, which was the previous projection), Watermaster's engineer

explained that significant enhancements to Watermaster's recharge facilities would be required. (Id. at ¶ 23.)

One of the conditions of approval of Peace II is for Watermaster to prepare an updated Recharge Master Plan that describes how recharge will occur, on a long-term basis, within the Basin. (Watermaster Exhibit No. 6.) The method by which Watermaster funds operation and maintenance, as well as administrative costs and capital improvements such as the Recharge Master Plan, is through a system of assessments, or a tax on all groundwater production in the Appropriative Pool. Under this system of assessments, the Appropriative Pool will be responsible for virtually all of the costs associated with improving the recharge facilities in accordance with the Recharge Master Plan, even though such improvements will provide a benefit to *all* producers in the Chino Basin. (DeLoach Decl., ¶ 24.) When the Appropriative Pool became aware of the significant costs associated with these improvements, the Appropriative Pool began to discuss various funding mechanisms. (*Id.* at ¶ 25.)

Ultimately, the Appropriative Pool determined that monetizing the purchased Non-Ag Pool water in storage through an auction of that water could produce a viable source of funding for the significant costs of recharge enhancements. (*Id.* at ¶ 26.) Absent such a funding mechanism, the cost of the recharge enhancements would ultimately be borne by the public ratepayers. (*Id.* at ¶ 27.) Although the Non-Ag Pool motion describes the auction as a "windfall" for the Appropriators, the Non-Ag Pool knew that the proceeds were to be used to fund recharge enhancements in the Basin, a benefit to the entire Basin. (*Id.* at ¶ 28.)

In June 2009, the Advisory Committee and the Board approved a Template Storage and Recovery Agreement that would allow for the implementation of the auction. Mr. Bowcock voted to approve the Agreement and thus voted in favor of proceeding with the auction.³ (See Watermaster Exhibit No. 9.) In July 2009, the Appropriative Pool and the Non-Ag Pool entered into a Stipulation detailing how the proceeds from the auction would be utilized as between the

³ It is ironic that the Non-Ag Pool pleading criticizes the Appropriators for making the water available to "speculative investors" when one of the largest Non-Ag Pool members – Aqua Capital Management (for whom Mr. Bowcock was a principal from at least 2007 until at least the beginning of 2009) – is itself one of these "speculative investors," and is headquartered in Omaha, Nebraska. (DeLoach Decl., ¶¶ 34-36.)

Non-Ag Pool and the Appropriative Pool. Mr. Bowcock signed the Stipulation on behalf of the Non-Ag Pool. (See Watermaster Exhibit No. 10.) Watermaster reported the Stipulation to the Court and asked for approval of the Template Storage and Recovery Agreement. No party objected, and the Template Storage and Recovery Agreement was approved by the Court on August 11, 2009. (Watermaster Exhibit No. 11.)

F. NOTICE OF INTENT TO PURCHASE WAS APPROVED AND PROVIDED

On August 13, 2009, at the joint meeting between the Appropriative Pool and the Non-Ag Pool, the Appropriative Pool considered the written Notice of Intent to Purchase the Non-Ag water so that the Appropriative Pool could move forward with the auction. (Bowcock Decl., Exhibits H & I.) A form of the Notice had been provided in the agenda packet for that meeting; the Pool finalized the Notice and approved it unanimously and without qualification. (*Ibid.*) The Notice is a written document prominently titled "Notice of Intent to Purchase." (See Watermaster Exhibit No. 12.)

The language of the Notice was written in the present tense to reflect that notice was being provided as of August 13, 2009, but the Appropriative Pool decided to use an "effective date" of December 18, 2009, because it intended to use proceeds from the auction to pay the Non-Ag Pool for the water. (See Watermaster Exhibit No. 12.) The language of the Notice is as follows:

Pursuant to Section C of the Purchase and Sale Agreement for the Purchase of Water by Watermaster from Overlying (Non-Agricultural) Pool, Watermaster hereby provides notice to the Overlying (Non-Agricultural) Pool that Watermaster intends to tender purchase of the Storage Transfer Quantity pursuant to the terms of the Purchase and Sale Agreement for the following uses: 36,000 acre-feet for use in a Storage and Recovery Agreement, and 2,652 acre-feet for use as Desalter replenishment.

On August 13, 2009 the Appropriative Pool provided approval for the issuance of this Notice. The date of issuance of this notice is December 18, 2009. (Watermaster Exhibit No. 12.)

At that meeting, the Appropriative Pool also discussed developing a "Plan B," which provided an alternate funding mechanism to purchase the water should the auction not proceed as planned. (See Bowcock Decl., Exhibit I.) Notably, because the Non-Ag Pool meetings were held

jointly with the Appropriative Pool meetings, Mr. Sage, an employee of Mr. Bowcock's and frequent alternate Non-Ag Pool representative, was present for the Appropriative Pool's approval of the Notice and discussion of Plan B. (*Ibid.*)

The written Notice, as approved by the Appropriative Pool, was transmitted as part of the Agenda Packet for the August 27, 2009 Advisory Committee and Board meeting. (See Bowcock Decl., Exhibit X.) This packet was sent to the Non-Ag Pool representative via regular mail and email. (See Molino Decl., ¶¶ 10, 13.) At the August 27, 2009 Advisory Committee meeting, the Advisory Committee approved the Notice as to 36,000 acre-feet and referred the 2,652 acre-feet to the Appropriative Pool for further discussion as to the use of the water. The Board, acting on the Advisory Committee's recommendation, took the same action. Mr. Sage was present at the Advisory Committee and Board Meeting and voted in favor of approving the Notice. (See Bowcock Decl., Exhibit K) The Appropriative Pool subsequently decided not to make any changes as to the use of the 2,652 acre-feet and thus took no further action.

Pursuant to Section C of the Agreement, prior approval by the Appropriative Pool is required in order for the Notice to be operable. That approval was provided, unequivocally, on August 13, 2009. (See Bowcock Decl., Exhibit I.) Thereafter, a final version of the written Notice, as approved by the Appropriative Pool, was distributed as part of the August 27, 2009 Advisory Committee and Board Meeting Agenda Packet, which was received by the Non-Ag Pool representative. (Bowcock Decl., Exhibit X.)

G. THE NON-AG POOL'S REPRESENTATIVE HAD ACTUAL NOTICE OF THE APPROPRIATIVE POOL'S INTENT TO PURCHASE AND WAS PRESENT AND ACTIVELY INVOLVED THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE TIME DURING AND FOLLOWING THE NOTICE

From August through October, the Appropriative Pool and Watermaster prepared for the auction. (DeLoach Decl., ¶ 29.) Numerous meetings and workshops were held to discuss issues related to the auction. (*Ibid.*) The Non-Ag Pool's Representatives, Mr. Bowcock and/or Mr. Sage, were present at meetings throughout the auction process. (*Id.* at ¶ 30.) At no time during that period did Mr. Bowcock, Mr. Sage, or any other member of the Non-Ag Pool state at any Pool Meeting, Advisory Committee Meeting, or Board Meeting that they felt Notice had not been

provided. (*Id.* at ¶ 32.) At no time did Mr. Bowcock, Mr. Sage or any other member of the Non-Ag Pool express concerns with the auction or object to the Appropriative Pool's activities relating to the auction of Non-Ag Pool's stored water. (*Id.* at ¶ 33.)

On October 30, 2009, the parties decided to postpone the auction based on concerns expressed by potential bidders regarding the ability to recover and use the water. (Manning Decl., ¶ 12, 13; see also, Bowcock Decl., ¶ 19.) Just six days later, on November 5, 2009, the Appropriative Pool voted to approve Plan B. (Bowcock Decl., Exhibits O & Q.) Importantly, Plan B included authorization to assess the Appropriative Pool so that Watermaster could tender the first payment to the Non-Ag Pool. At the November 19, 2009 Advisory Committee and Board Meeting, at which a representative for the Non-Ag Pool was present, Watermaster staff briefed the Advisory Committee and the Board regarding the water that had already been purchased from the Non-Ag Pool and provided a hand-out showing the Plan B cost to each Appropriative Pool member. (Watermaster Exhibit Nos. 14 & 15.) Thus, the Non-Ag Pool knew that the Appropriative Pool had assessed itself in order to tender payment for the water. (Motion at p. 10.) On December 17, 2009, Mr. Bowcock attended a Board Meeting on behalf of the Non-Ag Pool and did not mention any concern that Notice had not been provided.

H. THE NON-AG MOTION SEEKS A SIGNIFICANTLY HIGHER PROFIT FROM THE SALE OF THE STORED WATER

Mr. Bowcock and Mr. Penrice first raised the issue of notice on January 7, 2010, just days after MWD announced a significant rate increase. (See Manning Decl., ¶ 16.) Under Section H (Early Termination) of the Agreement, if the Notice is not provided and the condition subsequent is not satisfied, the Non-Ag Pool can sell the water in storage for 92% of the now-current MWD replenishment rate. Based on the MWD replenishment rates cited in the Non-Ag Pool Motion (Bowcock Decl., Exhibit K), the potential selling price under Section H is, at a minimum, \$4.3 million higher than the selling price negotiated in 2007 and described under Sections C and D, which was based on 92% of the then-current (2007) replenishment rate (along with a CPI adjustment). Thus, if the Non-Ag Pool succeeds in its Paragraph 31 Motion, the Pool members (including Aqua Capital Management) stand to earn a significant windfall profit over and above

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that which was contemplated in 2007. This profit will come at the expense of the citizens of the Chino Basin during a particularly difficult economic downturn.

III. **ARGUMENT**

The Non-Ag Pool argues, without support, that the Agreement is a unilateral "Option Contract." The Non-Ag Pool makes this argument so it can avail itself of the strict notice requirements adhering to option contracts. As detailed below, the Agreement is not an option contract but rather, it is clearly and unambiguously a bi-lateral contract containing an express condition subsequent. As such, the Notice requirements should be viewed in light of the doctrine of substantial performance. Nonetheless, even if the Non-Ag Pool is correct (which it is not), its Motion should be denied because even under the more stringent requirements utilized for option contracts, the Notice requirements were satisfied.

THE AGREEMENT IS AN EXECUTED BILATERAL CONTRACT, NOT A. AN OPTION AGREEMENT

The Agreement cannot be construed as an option contract because (1) by its express terms, it characterizes the Notice as a condition subsequent, (2) the language of the Agreement indicates that contract formation occurred upon execution, not delivery of Notice, (3) the Agreement binds Watermaster to terms prior to the time when Notice is due, and (4) the Agreement confers a benefit on the Non-Ag Pool even if Notice is not provided within the relevant time period. In the event of ambiguity, California law presumes a contract to be bilateral rather than an option. (Perry v. Berryman (1949) 95 Cal. App. 2d 159.) Here, the language is unambiguous, but even if it were not, the law would favor construing the Agreement as a bilateral contract.

The Notice is a Condition Subsequent, Not a Condition Precedent to 1. the Formation of the Agreement

By its terms, the plain language of the Agreement describes the Notice as a "condition subsequent" that is a condition of performance, not an "option." Section H of the Agreement provides:

Early Termination. This Agreement will expire and be of no further force and effect if: Watermaster does not issue its Notice of Intent to Purchase in accordance with Paragraph D above within twenty-four (24) months of Court approval. Upon Watermaster's failure to satisfy the condition subsequent, the rights of the Non-Agricultural (Overlying) Pool will remain unaffected and without prejudice as result of their having executed this Agreement except that in the event of Early Termination, the Storage Transfer Quantity, will then be made available for purchase by Watermaster and thence the members of the Appropriative Pool in accordance with Paragraph 9.(iv) of Amended Exhibit G, the Overlying (Non-Agricultural) Pool, Pooling Plan. (See Watermaster Exhibit No. 1 [emphasis added].)

Notably, the Agreement explicitly describes issuance of notice as a "condition subsequent" in Section H.

A condition subsequent is a term of a contract that the happening or nonoccurrence of a future event after the contract becomes binding on the parties permits the other party to terminate the contract, if he chooses to avail himself of the condition, without further duties or obligations on any party. (Civil Code § 1438.) In contrast, an option is a condition precedent to the formation of a bilateral contract, and "the optionee has no duty unless, and until, he accepts the irrevocable offer proposed to him by the optionor." (Palo Alto Town & Country Village Inc. v. BBTC Company (1974) 11 Cal.3d 494, 503.) As noted by the Non-Ag Pool, option contracts are unique in that, upon execution, only one party, the optionor, is bound while the optionee is entirely free to accept or not. (Hayward Lumber & Inv. Co. v. Construction Prod. Corp. (1953) 117 Cal.App.2d 221, 229; see also, Motion at p.11.)

The clear intent that Notice operate as a condition *subsequent* is further demonstrated by the fact that the Agreement includes a separate section which recites a condition *precedent*. The ONLY condition precedent to the formation of the Agreement was the Court's approval of Peace II. Once the Court approved Peace II on December 21, 2007, the bilateral contract was formed.

2. The Plain Language of the Agreement is Clear Evidence that It Was Not an Option Agreement

Section H, and in particular the terms emphasized above, plainly and unequivocally indicate that a contract already had been formed and is binding on the parties before Notice is issued. (See Watermaster Exhibit No. 1) First, it refers to execution of the Agreement in the <u>past</u>

tense. Also, "early termination" is both its title and the articulated effect of a failure to provide Notice. Similarly, it states that the Agreement will "expire and be of no further force and effect." For a contract to "terminate," "expire" or cease to be of force, the terms of the contract must already be obligatory. For these reasons, the Non-Ag Pool's characterization of the Agreement as an "option," where the contract would not form until after notice is given, is fundamentally inconsistent with the plain language of Section H.

3. Non-Ag Pool Seeks to Manipulate and Take Advantage of the Benefits Conferred Through the Peace II Process

Not only has the contract already been formed, terms of the contract have already been performed by Watermaster, conferring substantial benefits to the Non-Ag Pool. In addition, the contract confers new rights on the Pool separate and apart from the sale of the water pursuant to Sections C and D. This is distinguishable from a unilateral executory option where the Watermaster would have *no duty unless, and until* Notice is given. (*Palo Alto Town & Country, supra,* 11 Cal.3d at p. 503; see also, Motion at 11.)

Specifically, the Agreement confers a benefit on the Non-Ag Pool even if Notice is not provided within the relevant time period – specifically, the right to sell the water in storage pursuant to the Judgment Amendment to Exhibit "G", which was part of the Peace II negotiations. The terms of the Non-Ag Pool Pooling Plan were modified to allow the Pool to sell unused water annually, on a go-forward basis, to the Appropriators for a fixed price. (See Watermaster Exhibit No. 8.) Indeed, it is this very benefit that motivates the Non-Ag Pool to now claim that the condition subsequent was not met, particularly because the price of the water made available if the condition subsequent was not provided is higher than the price pursuant to the Agreement. The fact that a benefit is conferred on the Non-Ag Pool via Section H and the related Amendment to Attachment "G," and the fact that the Appropriative Pool was bound by the provisions of the Agreement when it executed the Agreement in 2007, means that the Agreement cannot, by its terms, be an "option."

THE CONDITION SUBSEQUENT WAS SATISFIED B. 1 2 1. The Written Notice Provided in the August 27, 2009 Agenda Packet Met the Notice Requirements of Section C of the Agreement 3 As detailed above, Section C of the Purchase and Sale Agreement contains a condition 4 subsequent requiring Watermaster to provide Notice in order to prevent "Early Termination" 5 (under Section H) of the Agreement to which both parties were already bound. Section C of the 6 Agreement describes the requirements of the Notice: 7 8 Notice. Within twenty-four months of the final Court approval of this Agreement ("Effective Date"), and only with the prior approval of the Appropriative Pool, Watermaster will provide written Notice 9 of Intent to Purchase the Non-Agricultural (Overlying) Pool water pursuant to Section 5.3(a) of the Peace Agreement, which therein 10 identifies whether such payment will be in connection with the Desalter Replenishment or a Storage and Recovery Program. 11 (Watermaster Exhibit No. 1.) 12 According to the plain language of Section C, Watermaster satisfied the condition 13 subsequent because the Notice was (1) provided by Watermaster (2) in writing (3) within 24 14 months of the final Court approval of the Agreement (4) with prior approval of the Appropriative 15 Pool, and (5) it specified the quantity of water to be used for a Desalter Replenishment or a 16 Storage and Recovery Program. 17 The Notice Was Required To Be "Provided" Or "Issued," Not 18 "Delivered;" Watermaster Provided Notice In A Manner That Was Reasonable, Usual And Customary, And Notice Was Actually 19 Received 20 The Non-Ag Pool erroneously contends that the Agreement requires Notice to be 21 "delivered." (Motion at pp. 3, 8, 14.) This is contrary to the express language of the Agreement, 22 which states in Section C that Watermaster will *provide* written Notice of Intent to Purchase. 23 Elsewhere in the Agreement, it refers to Watermaster "issuing" Notice (Sections E and H). 24

Watermaster has thoroughly addressed this issue in its Opposition to the Motion; thus, it will not be repeated here. (See Watermaster Opposition at pp. 10-12.) Likewise, Watermaster has explained that it provided the Notice in a manner that was reasonable, usual and customary,

Neither the word "provide" nor the word "issue" connotes "delivery" of the Notice.

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and that Notice was actually received by the Non-Ag Pool representative. (See Watermaster Opposition at pp. 19-25).

> It is Reasonable for the Appropriative Pool to Rely on the Non-Ag b. Pool's Representative to Report Back to Its Pool Members Important Issues Concerning Its Pool

In addition, the customary practice has been for Mr. Bowcock to represent the entire Pool, negotiate on behalf of the entire Pool, and sign documents on behalf of the entire Pool that legally bind the entire Pool. (DeLoach Decl., ¶ 19.) Mr. Bowcock negotiated and executed the Purchase and Sale Agreement on behalf of the entire Pool; not one individual Pool member signed the document. (Id. at ¶ 20.) It was Mr. Bowcock's responsibility, as the Non-Ag Pool representative, to keep the individual members of the Pool informed.

For the Non-Ag Pool to now claim otherwise is tantamount to an outright rejection of the process of self-governance upon which the parties have justifiably come to rely. The Watermaster process is one of openness and transparency, much like that of a public agency. As the representative of the Non-Ag Pool, a member of the Advisory Committee, and a member of the Board, Mr. Bowcock has had the opportunity and the duty to participate robustly in this process. To claim that Mr. Bowcock (or his specified designee) could not accept Notice on behalf of the Pool, or to claim that the Pool was uninformed of months of activities that occurred as part of this process even though Mr. Bowcock participated in and assented to these activities, is not only irresponsible, it is an abject rejection of the Pool's duties as a good-faith participant in the process.

> The Appropriative Pool Spent a Substantial Amount of Money c. With the Understanding that a Valid Contract Was Formed and The Condition Subsequent Had Been Satisfied

In the months following the provision of the Notice, the Appropriative Pool expended substantial sums of money to develop the plan to auction the water and held numerous public workshops regarding the auction. (DeLoach Decl., ¶ 29.) After the auction was postponed on October 30, the Appropriative Pool immediately approved "Plan B," which provided an alternate method to fund the purchase of the water. (Bowcock Decl., Exhibit O.) Never once did the Appropriative Pool indicate that it would not, or even might not, proceed with the purchase of the water. From the Appropriative Pool's perspective, it was bound by the Agreement and intended to proceed. (DeLoach Decl., ¶ 31.)

Never once did the Non-Ag Pool indicate that it believed Notice had not been given or was inadequate. If it is true the Non-Ag Pool believed Notice had not been given, how is it the Non-Ag Pool did not object to the auction? How could the auction proceed unless the Appropriative Pool had the authority to sell the water to a third party? How could the Appropriative Pool sell the water to a third party unless Notice had been provided that the Appropriative Pool would purchase the water? The answers to these questions (along with any significant legal authority) are conspicuously absent from the Non-Ag Pool's pleading.

d. The Notice Properly Identified The Use Of The Water
Consistent with Section C of the Agreement, the Notice that was approved by the
Appropriative Pool on August 13, 2009 designates 36,000 acre-feet for use in a Storage and
Recovery Agreement, and 2,652 acre-feet for use as Desalter replenishment. (See Watermaster
Exhibit No. 12.) At the August 27, 2009 Board meeting, the Board approved the Notice and
referred the 2,652 acre-feet to the Appropriative Pool for further discussion as to the use of the
water. (See Bowcock Decl., Exhibit K.)

The Non-Ag Pool contends that the Board's reference of a question regarding the intended use of the water, and its request for a "separate motion" in the event of a change to the Notice, constitutes a "rejection" of the Notice. (Motion at p. 5.)⁴ On its face, the Agreement does not require action by the Watermaster Board with respect to the Notice. Rather, it is action by the Appropriative Pool that is required prior to the time the Notice is provided because it is the Appropriative Pool that is ultimately responsible for providing the funding to tender payment to the Non-Ag Pool. On August 13, 2009, the Appropriative Pool approved the Notice; the approval

⁴ Based on the way Section C is drafted, it is not clear whether the identification of the use of the water is required to be included in the Notice, or whether the clause is instead referring to section 5.3 the Peace Agreement itself, "which therein" identifies authorized uses for the water (i.e., Desalter Replenishment or a Storage and Recovery Program). There is a colorable argument that the reference to section 5.3 was only for purposes of mentioning the Non-Ag Pool's right to transfer water to Watermaster for those purposes. Thus, the Notice itself does not need to contain the designation. To the extent this is true, the Non-Ag Pool's arguments are rendered entirely irrelevant (to the extent they are not otherwise irrelevant).

contained no conditions whatsoever. (See Watermaster Exhibit No. 12.) The final Notice, as approved by the Appropriative Pool, was provided by email and mail as part of the August 27 agenda package. (Molino Decl., ¶ 10, 13.) At that point, the condition subsequent was satisfied.

C. THE NOTICE PROVISION IN THE AGREEMENT MUST BE LIBERALLY CONSTRUED TO PREVENT FORFEITURE

1. Strict Compliance With Section C Of The Agreement Is Not Required

The Non-Ag Pool misapplies authority that requires strict compliance with notice requirements to the instant Agreement. The authority relied upon by the Non-Ag Pool only applies to option contracts, not bilateral contracts such as the Agreement. (See Motion at p. 11.) Courts have required strict compliance with respect to option contracts because, by the nature of an option contract, the optionor has bound himself to make a contract while the optionee is entirely free from any contractual obligation. (Hayward Lumber & Inv. Co. v. Construction Prod. Corp. (1953) 117 Cal.App.2d 221, 229.) However, as discussed above, the Agreement is not an option contract. The Agreement is a negotiated transaction under which the parties were bound to perform certain obligations, and no party had the absolute discretion to unilaterally discharge the obligations. As a policy matter, the Non-Ag Pool has not been disproportionately burdened by the Agreement and does not require the heightened protection afforded to optionors. Strict compliance is not required or warranted in this case.

What is mind boggling is that the Non-Ag Pool seeks to enforce Section H of the Agreement even though it claims that the option was not exercised. (Motion at p. 9.) If the Non-Ag Pool is right (which it is not), and the Agreement is really an option agreement (which it is not), failure to exercise the option would mean that an Agreement was never formed. It is fundamentally inconsistent for the Non-Ag Pool seek enforcement of a provision of a contract that it claims does not exist.

2. California Law Disfavors Forfeiture

Contrary to the Non-Ag Pool's assertion, the Watermaster's compliance with the notice requirement must be construed in the light most favorable to Watermaster. The Non-Ag Pool asks this Court to find Watermaster and the Appropriative Pool have lost their right to purchase

water under the terms of the Agreement due to a contrived hyper-technicality even though, as explained above, the Non-Ag Pool enjoys rights and benefits granted by the same instrument. California law disfavors such forfeitures and gives courts tools of construction and equity to avoid this type of injustice. (See, e.g., Civil Code §§ 1442, 3275; see also, Michaelian v. Elba Land Co. (1926) 76 Cal.App. 541, 554 [liberally construing terms of purchase contract for real property to prevent ouster of buyer]; Atkins v. Anderson (1956) 139 Cal.App.2d 918, 920 [estopping forfeiture where plaintiff had knowledge of the condition and participated in the violation]; Loughan v. Harger-Haldeman (1960) 184 Cal.App.2d 495, 502 [finding waiver to avoid forfeiture].) The burden of proving facts creating the forfeiture rests upon the party claiming the forfeiture. (Riedman v. Barkwill (1934) 139 Cal.App. 564, 567.)

a. The Court Must Interpret The Terms Of Section C Against The Non-Agricultural Pool In Order To Prevent Forfeiture

Under Civil Code, section 1442, the Court *must* construct the language of the Section C requirements to prevent early termination. Civil Code section 1442 requires courts to strictly interpret conditions involving a forfeiture against the party for whose benefit it is created⁵, and liberally construe them to prevent forfeiture. (*Division of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dick Bullis, Inc.* (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d Supp. 52, 58.) In this case, the Court cannot adopt the Non-Ag Pool's stringent and non-literal interpretation the language of Section C. Pursuant to Civil Code section 1442, and in keeping with the plain and unambiguous meaning of Section C, the Court must interpret the language to permit compliance with the Notice provision by any reasonable method.

b. Equitable Relief Is Warranted If Required To Avoid Forfeiture If the Court finds that a condition requiring forfeiture is express and cannot be avoided by construction, the Court may, in a proper case, excuse the condition or give equitable relief against its enforcement. (Civil Code § 3275; *Atkins v. Anderson, supra*, 139 Cal.App.2d at p. 920;

⁵ As stated in Section II.A herein, the Non-Ag Pool is the beneficiary of Section C because it allows them to transfer the water in storage outside the Pool for compensation, even though such benefits would not exist under common law principles or Article X, Section 2 of the California Constitution; and, the Non-Ag Pool also benefits in the event of forfeiture because it will profit by at least an additional \$4.3 million if its Paragraph 31 Motion is successful.

Loughan v. Harger-Haldeman, supra, 184 Cal.App.2d at p. 502.) Pursuant to Civil Code section 3275, "[w]henever, by the terms of an obligation, a party thereto incurs a forfeiture, or a loss in the nature of a forfeiture, by reason of his failure to comply with its provisions, he may be relieved therefrom, upon making full compensation to the other party, except in case of a grossly negligent, willful, or fraudulent breach of duty." Watermaster has tendered payment and would have already fulfilled the payment obligations of Section D if not refused by the Non-Ag Pool. (Manning Decl., ¶ 18; Bowcock Decl., ¶ 24.) As discussed below, there is no evidence or allegation of gross negligence or other willful conduct here. Thus, even if this Court finds that the Watermaster's Notice failed to comply with some aspect of Section C, the Court can – and should – uphold the Agreement.

As a general matter, courts have held that "a party should not be divested of valuable rights by way of forfeiture for default . . . unless it is clearly made to appear that the other party to the contract has suffered or will suffer serious detriment or damage by reason of such default, or unless it is made to appear that the default was intentional or willful." (*Atkins v. Anderson, supra*, 139 Cal.App.2d at p. 920.) The Non-Ag Pool brings this action and raises alleged defaults in the Notice not to remedy any perceived loss at the hands of the Watermaster — after all, the Non-Ag Pool actually received Notice of the intent to purchase the otherwise stranded asset at "market price"— but rather, to seek a "do-over" on more favorable terms. (See Motion at p. 10 [discussing the potential "incremental benefit" of \$112 per acre-foot]; see also, *Ballard v. MacCallum* (1940) 15 Cal.2d 439, 443 ["[t]here is nothing inequitable in a bargain merely because it turns out better for one party than the other"].)

In Santa Monica v. Jones, (1951) 104 Cal.App.2d 463, 470, ["Santa Monica"] the court found that where grantors failed to inspect for violations or raise objections to alleged breaches of conditions in a grant deed "the violations must be regarded as altogether too minor to warrant forfeiture of a fee property ... [a]fterall the law does not regard mere trifles as a basis for forfeiture." The record demonstrates that representatives of the Non-Ag Pool received the Notice, were aware of its contents, and, in fact, voted to approve it. (Molino Decl., ¶¶ 10, 13; Manning Decl., ¶¶ 17; Bowcock Decl., Exhibits I & K.) Yet, no member of the Non-Ag Pool raised any -20 -

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objection to the form or method of delivery of the Notice at any time before it came due. As the court reasoned in Santa Monica, even if the Notice fell short of the requirements of Section C in some way, any nonconformity was too minor to capture the attention of members of the Non-Ag Pool despite their intimate knowledge of the proceedings, and any resulting loss is too minor to justify a forfeiture.6

The Non-Ag Pool also cannot claim a grossly negligent or willful default on the part of the Watermaster. The record demonstrates that all parties, Watermaster, the Appropriative Pool and the Non-Ag Pool, believed the condition subsequent had been met. (Manning Decl., ¶ 17; DeLoach Decl., ¶ 31.) Even if the Court finds the Notice technically fails to satisfy a requirement of Section C, in light of the exhaustive efforts to comply, it cannot be argued Watermaster acted with gross negligence. For these reasons, the Court must use the available tools to avoid the forfeiture of Watermaster's right to purchase water under the terms of Section D.

EVEN IF THE PURCHASE AND SALE AGREEMENT IS CONSTRUED D. AS AN OPTION CONTRACT, WATERMASTER'S NOTICE CONSTITUTES VALID EXERCISE OF THE OPTION

Regardless of whether Section C notice is construed as a condition subsequent or a condition precedent to the exercise of an option contract, Watermaster's Notice satisfies all of the applicable requirements, including the requirement that it be "provided." As such, even if the Agreement is viewed as an option contract, the Notice was an unequivocal acceptance of the Non-Ag Pool's offer and bound both parties to the terms of the Agreement.

Even if the Court finds the Agreement specified a particular mode of delivery, the Notice issued by Watermaster nonetheless formed a binding contract because it was actually received by the Non-Ag Pool, and the Non-Ag Pool waived any defect in the Notice by failing to raise it despite ample time and opportunity to do so. In addition, under the precedent cited by the Non-Ag Pool, the Notice was clear and unequivocal.

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⁶ This is true assuming, arguendo, the Non-Ag Pool's reason for failing to raise objection was pure. If, as the evidence might suggest, the Non-Ag Pool withheld its objections in order to obtain a favorable purchase price via its Motion, such facts would bolster the argument any forfeiture has been waived because the Non-Ag Pool's conduct was knowing, the Non-Ag Pool has not suffered a real loss, and the Appropriative Pool and Watermaster did not act with any intent to default. See addition discussion of waiver in Section D.3, below.

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1. Under Section C And California Law, Any Reasonable And Usual Mode Of Acceptance May Be Adopted.

As a general rule, "[i]f a proposal prescribes any conditions concerning the communication of its acceptance, the proposer is not bound unless they are conformed to; but in other cases any reasonable and usual mode may be adopted." (Civil Code § 1582.) Watermaster thoroughly addresses this argument in its Opposition. (See Watermaster Opposition at pp. 19-25.)

2. Notice Was Sufficient On the Separate Ground That It Was Actually Received

Even if some fault is found with delivery of the Notice as part of the mailed agenda packet, the Notice is nonetheless valid because it was actually received. Once an acceptance reaches an offeror, the means of transmission becomes immaterial, and improperly dispatched acceptance is treated as operative so long as it is received within a reasonable amount of time. (1 Witkin Sum. Cal. Law Contracts § 190; see also, Rest.2d, Contracts § \$66, 67; 2 Williston 4th, §6:35 et seq.; *Johnson v. Banta* (1948) 87 Cal.App.2d 907.) Courts uphold contracts where there is actual receipt of acceptance despite a technical error in the method of transmission in part because the offeror is in no way inconvenienced. (*Johnson v. Banta, supra*, 87 Cal.App.2d at 909-910.) The Non-Ag Pool's complaints about the complexity of the e-mail delivery system (Motion at p.12) are inapposite because the Agreement does not expressly provide any conditions upon the method of delivery, email communications are expressly permitted and regularly used (Molino Decl., ¶ 6, 7), and in any event, Mr. Bowcock was sent a copy of the agenda packet via U.S. mail (Molino Decl., ¶ 10, 13), and Mr. Bowcock's designee was present at both the August 13, 2009 Appropriative Pool/Non-Ag Pool Meeting and the August 27, 2009 Board Meeting (Bowcock Decl., Exhibits I & K).

3. The Non-Agricultural Pool Waived All Objections To The Notice By Failing To Raise Them Prior To The Due Date

Even if the Notice is found to vary in some respects from the requirements of Section C, the Non-Ag Pool waived any objection it might have to the Notice when it failed to raise any defects to the Watermaster or the Appropriative Pool despite ample opportunity to do so. (Riverside Fence Co. v. Novak (1969) 273 Cal.App.2d 656; Collins v. Marvel Land Co. (1970) 13 Cal.App.3d 34 ["Collins"].) "The reason for this rule is that an optionee should be able to remedy any defects in his tender and prevent the optionor from remaining silent at the time of the tender and later surprise the optionee with hidden objections." (Rollins v. Stokes (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 701, 713 ["Rollins"]; Layton v. West (1969) 271 Cal.App.2d 508, 512.) Not only did the Non-Ag Pool fail to raise any defects, evidence demonstrates that it affirmatively acted and spoke as if the Agreement had been performed.

In *Collins, supra*, 13 Cal.App.3d 34, the parties entered into a written option agreement for the sale of land in which the agreement provided that the option was to be exercised by "delivering written notice of exercise of this option addressed to [the defendant] and delivered to its attorneys ... at their offices ..., or by mailing same to said attorneys... postage prepaid, by certified mail." (*Id.* at p. 39.) The only notice given by plaintiff was oral notice to defendant's attorney six days before the expiration of the option. (*Ibid.*) The parties later failed to come to terms on the escrow instructions, and, after the period for exercising the option had expired, the defendant declared the option of no further force and effect for failure to provide written notice. (*Id.* at pp. 39-40.) The court held "[a]lthough defendants had the power to require a written exercise of the option, this requirement was for the benefit of the defendant and may be waived by them. The acceptance of the exercise of the option without objection to the form of the exercise waives any objection to the form of the exercise." (*Id.* at p. 40 [citations omitted].)

In *Rollins, supra*, 123 Cal.App.3d 701, a lessee had a preemptive right to purchase property within 15 days of being notified by lessor of an offer from any other person. Arguably, the lessee was required to "evidence [his] matching ... offer within 15 days by delivering [lessor] a check and [his] written agreement to purchase on [those] terms." (*Id.* at pp. 707.) Before the expiration of 15 days, the lessor received from lessee a letter in which lessee confirmed his intent to purchase the property on matching terms and a check representing lessee's down payment. (*Ibid.*) Lessee did not provide a written agreement until several weeks later. (*Id.* at p. 707-708.)

The lessor did not object. The court held, even if the above stated terms applied to lessee's notice, "he substantially complied and [lessor] waived any defective tender." (*Id.* at p. 713.)

Both *Collins* and *Rollins*, involve an optionee's blatant failure to comply with clear and unambiguous requirements of notice. Yet, in each of those cases, the courts found the optionor's silence constituted waiver and binding agreements were formed. Here, as discussed above, the Notice meets each and every requirement in Section C. However, even if the Court finds some aspect of the Notice varies from the terms of Section C, under the precedent set forth in *Collins* and *Rollins*, the Agreement must be upheld.

Like *Collins* and *Rollins*, the Non-Ag Pool received the Watermaster's Notice well before the deadline for Notice was due (approximately four months prior to the deadline). (Manning Decl., ¶ 17; Molino Decl., ¶ 5, 10, 13; Bowcock Decl., Exhibit K.) Over the ensuing months, the members had ample time and opportunity to raise any alleged defect. The Non-Ag Pool must have been aware that, upon notification of a defect, the Watermaster most certainly would have fixed and reissued the Notice. Such knowledge can be implied from their presence at meetings in which the Watermaster and the Appropriative Pool discussed expensive plans for holding an auction to the sell the Storage Water, and, when the auction was postponed, the Appropriative Pool quickly approved Plan B to assess itself for the funds to pay for the purchased water. (Bowcock Decl., Exhibits I, K, M, O; Watermaster Exhibit No. 13.) Even according to the allegations made in the Non-Ag Pool motion, when Mr. Penrice raised the issue for the first time at the January 7, 2010 meeting, he and Mr. Bowcock were immediately handed a copy of the Notice. (Manning Decl. ¶ 17.)

The Non-Ag Pool, however, remained silent and laid in wait until after the deadline had passed to raise objections to the Notice for the first time. (Manning Decl., ¶ 16.) Even more detrimental than its silence, the Non-Ag Pool made comments that presupposed that the sale was done, and Mr. Bowcock even indicated that Non-Ag Pool member Aqua Capital contemplated being a "player" in the deal. (DeLoach Decl., ¶ 32.) Thus, even if the Court finds that the Watermaster's Notice did not comply with the requirements of Section C, the Non-Ag Pool's failure to raise an objection constitutes waiver, and the option has been exercised. The Non-Ag

Pool should not be rewarded for its failure to utilize the process of self-governance that has been utilized by the parties for many years.

E. THE PURCHASE AND SALE AGREEMENT MUST BE CONSIDERED IN THE LARGER CONTEXT OF THE PEACE II PACKAGE

It is important to understand the Agreement is just one component of the entire Peace II package, which was the product of a series of lengthy, good-faith negotiations between the parties. Judgment Amendment to Exhibit G, which provides a mechanism for the Non-Ag Pool to transfer water outside the Pool on an annual basis, may not have been part of Peace II separate and apart from the Agreement. (DeLoach Decl., ¶ 21.) Thus, Peace II is properly viewed as a series of interdependent covenants. If a portion of the totally bargained-for package is manipulated, it is possible that other portions of Peace II will need to be renegotiated.

In addition, when the Court approved Peace II on December 21, 2007, its approval was conditioned on the satisfaction of eight conditions subsequent. (Watermaster Exhibit No. 6.) The last of these is the filing by Watermaster of the updated Recharge Master Plan, which is due no later than July 2010. (*Ibid.*) The Appropriative Pool had planned on using proceeds from the auction as the primary funding mechanism for the improvements required by the updated Recharge Master Plan. (DeLoach Decl., ¶ 26.) Because of the ongoing dispute, the auction has been put off indefinitely. Thus, the Appropriative Pool may be forced to request that Watermaster delay the filing and implementation of the updated Plan. If the funding source for the Recharge Master Plan is lost, the Appropriative Pool may be forced to reconsider altogether the Basin management approach outlined in Peace II.

Lastly, for at least the last ten years, the parties to the Judgment have negotiated in good faith and have operated from a position of mutual respect. Even in the midst of disagreements over law, fact and policy, the parties have always maintained a position of trust vis-à-vis one another. In contrast, this Motion turns "good-faith" on its head. The Non-Ag Pool is motivated by avarice and personal gain, and its Motion will have far-reaching consequences that, unfortunately, negatively impact trust, which is fundamental to the ability of the parties to work

together in the future as effective Basin managers and stewards of an essential resource that is a vital and basic public necessity.

F. THE APPROPRIATIVE POOL SHOULD BE AWARDED DAMAGES FOR ANTICIPATORY BREACH

By filing the Motion, the Non-Ag Pool has breached the Agreement and Peace II, and, as such, the Appropriative Pool is entitled to recover attorneys' fees and costs. If a promisor expressly repudiates a contract by unequivocal refusal to perform, he or she is guilty of an anticipatory breach, and the promisee may immediately exercise the available remedies. (1 Witkin Sum. Cal. Law. Contracts §§ 862, 863; *Mayo v. Pacific Project Consultants, Inc.* (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 1013.) The filing of a legal action questioning the validity of an agreement has been held to be an express repudiation of that agreement. (*Mayo v. Pacific Project Consultants, Inc.* (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 1013 ["*Mayo*"]; *In re Marriage of Burkle* (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 712.) In *Mayo*, a plaintiff brought an action seeking to quiet title to real property against any claim under a joint venture agreement. (*Mayo, supra*, 1 Cal.App.3d at p. 1017.) The court held that the action constituted a repudiation of that agreement, and the court allowed defendant's cross claim for monetary damages under the agreement. (*Ibid.*)

Similarly, in *In re Marriage of Burkle*, a wife filed a petition for dissolution of her marriage in which she stated that a post-marital agreement was void and unenforceable. (*In re Marriage of Burkle* (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 712.) The court held that the petition constituted unequivocal repudiation excusing the husband's future performance under the post-marital agreement. (*Ibid.*) Thus, by filing the Paragraph 31 Motion, the Non-Ag Pool has expressly repudiated the Agreement and is therefore guilty of anticipatory breach.

Section 9.2(d) of the Peace Agreement provides "[i]n any adversarial proceeding between the Parties other than the dispute resolution procedure set forth [therein] and under the Judgment, the prevailing Party shall be entitled to recover their costs, including reasonable attorneys' fees. If there is no clear prevailing Party, the Court shall determine the prevailing Party and provide for the award of costs and reasonable attorneys' fees." (Watermaster Exhibit No. 5.)

Attorneys' fees and costs should be awarded as a measure of damages for the Non-Ag Pool's anticipatory breach. Because the Appropriative Pool is responsible for paying approximately 98 percent of Watermaster's costs, this award of attorneys' fees should include not only the Appropriative Pool's fees, but also Watermaster's attorneys' fees.

IV. <u>CONCLUSION</u>

The Non-Ag Pool's verisimilitudes concerning governance and Appropriative Pool hegemony are properly separately addressed rather than serving as an integument for the legal and factual issues before the Court concerning a basic and straightforward contractual matter.

Put simply, there is no basis in law or fact for the Court to provide the relief requested by the Non-Ag Pool. If the Non-Ag Pool truly believes that issues of governance and the manner in which Watermaster administers the Judgment require Court review, the Appropriative Pool encourages the Court to schedule workshop-type hearings as was done by Judge Wade so that the Court can comprehensively review Watermaster activities. Such a review is warranted in any instance because prior to February 2011 the Court will be required to determine whether the ninemember Watermaster Board should be reappointed to continue to serve as Watermaster.

Thus, for the reasons set forth herein, the Appropriative Pool respectfully requests that this Court summarily deny the Non-Ag Pool's Motion.

Dated: April 19, 2010

No.

Attorney for Appropriative Pool

1 2	John J. Schatz (State Bar No. 141029) Attorney at Law P.O. Box 7775		
3	Laguna Niguel, Ca. 92607-7775 Phone: (949) 683-0398	•	
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5	Attorney for the Appropriative Pool		
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7			
8			
9	SUPERIOR COURT OF	THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA	
10	COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO		
11			
12	CHINO BASIN MUNICIPAL WATER DISTRICT,	Case No. RCV 51010 Assigned for All Purposes to the Honorable	
13	Plaintiff,	Stanford E. Reichert	
14	V.	DECLARATION OF ROBERT A.	
15	CITY OF CHINO, et al.,	DELOACH	
16	Defendants.	[Filed Concurrently With The Appropriative Pool's Opposition To The Motion By The	
17 18		Overlying (Non-Agricultural) Pool Committee For Court Review Of Watermaster Actions Pursuant To Section 31 Of Judgment]	
19		Date: May 14, 2010	
20		Time: 10:30 a.m. Dept: C-1	
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28	RVPUB\IWILLIS\770484.1		
		F ROBERT A. DELOACH	

I, ROBERT A. DELOACH, declare:

- I am the General Manager and Chief Executive Officer of Cucamonga Valley
 Water District ("CVWD"), which is a member of the Appropriative Pool.
- 2. I have personal knowledge of the facts contained herein, and if called to testify as a witness, I could competently testify to the facts contained herein.
- 3. On behalf of Cucamonga Valley Water District, I have been involved in matters associated with the Chino Basin Watermaster since 1997. Prior to that, in my capacity as Director of Public Works and Engineering for the City of Pomona, I was involved in matters relating to the Chino Basin from 1991-1997. I was actively involved in the negotiation of the Peace Agreement and the Peace II Agreement.
- 4. In 2005, I served as Vice-Chair of the Appropriative Pool. In 2006, I served as Chair of the Appropriative Pool. In 2008, I served as Chair of the Advisory Committee. In 2009, I served as Vice-Chair of the Advisory Committee. Since January 2010, I am again serving as the Chair of the Advisory Committee.

The Chino Basin Judgment and Governance

- 5. The Appropriative Pool is made up almost entirely of public agencies and other not-for-profit entities. These entities answer to their ratepayers and exist solely for the purpose of providing a public service.
- Other than the City of Ontario and San Bernardino County, the members of the Non-Ag Pool consist largely of for-profit, private companies.

The Peace Agreement

7. During the negotiation of the Peace Agreement, it was my understanding that many parties to the Judgment believed that unused Non-Ag Pool water should be re-allocated and placed to beneficial use within the Basin without compensation to the Non-Ag Pool, consistent with the method utilized for surplus Agricultural Pool water, rather than being allowed to accumulate in storage.

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DECLARATION OF ROBERT A. DELOACH

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system of assessments, or a tax on all groundwater production in the Appropriative Pool. Under

this system of assessments, the Appropriative Pool will be responsible for virtually all of the costs

associated with improving the recharge facilities in accordance with the Recharge Master Plan, a benefit to all producers in the Chino Basin.

- 25. When the Appropriative Pool became aware of the significant costs associated with these improvements, the Appropriative Pool began to discuss various funding mechanisms.
- 26. Ultimately, the Appropriative Pool determined that monetizing the purchased Non-Ag Pool water in storage through an auction of that water could produce a viable source of funding for the significant costs of recharge enhancements.
- 27. Absent such a funding mechanism, the cost of the recharge enhancements would ultimately be borne by the public ratepayers.
- 28. The Non-Ag Pool knew that the proceeds were to be used to fund recharge enhancements in the Basin, a benefit to the entire Basin, because Mr. Bowcock signed a Stipulation on behalf of the Non-Ag Pool detailing how the proceeds would be used.
- 29. From August through October 2009, the Appropriative Pool and Watermaster prepared for the auction. During this time, the Appropriative Pool expended substantial sums of money to develop the plan to auction the water and held numerous public workshops regarding the auction.
- 30. The Non-Ag Pool's Representatives, Mr. Bowcock and/or Mr. Sage, were present at meetings throughout the auction process, as was I.
- 31. Never once during this time did the Appropriative Pool indicate that it would not, or even might not, proceed with the purchase of the water. From the Appropriative Pool's perspective, it was bound by the Agreement and intended to proceed.
- 32. I am not aware of any statements by Mr. Bowcock, Mr. Sage, or any other member of the Non-Ag Pool at any Pool Meeting, Advisory Committee Meeting, or Board Meeting that they felt Notice had not been provided. In fact, Mr. Bowcock made statements indicating that he thought the sale was a "done deal." Mr. Bowcock also indicated that Aqua Capital Management contemplated being a "player" in the deal.
- 33. At no time that I am aware did Mr. Bowcock, Mr. Sage or any other member of the Non-Ag Pool express concerns with the auction or object to the Appropriative Pool's RVPUBJWILLISY70484.1 4 -

1	activities relating to the auction of Non-Ag Pool's stored water.
2	Aqua Capital Management
3	34. My understanding is that one of the largest Non-Ag Pool members is Aqua Capital
4	Management.
5	35. My understanding is that Mr. Bowcock was a principal with Aqua Capital
6	Management from at least 2007 until at least the beginning of 2009.
7	36. My understanding is that Aqua Capital Management is headquartered in Omaha,
8	Nebraska.
9	
10	I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is
11	true and correct, and that this declaration was executed on April 19, 2010, at Rancho Cucamonga,
12	California.
13	\mathcal{L}
14	Marca, Marca
15	ROBERT A. DELOACH
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CHINO BASIN WATERMASTER

Case No. RCV 51010

Chino Basin Municipal Water District v. The City of Chino

PROOF OF SERVICE

I declare that:

I am employed in the County of San Bernardino, California. I am over the age of 18 years and not a party to the within action. My business address is Chino Basin Watermaster, 9641 San Bernardino Road, Rancho Cucamonga, California 91730; telephone (909) 484-3888.

On April 19, 2010 I served the following:

- 1) THE APPROPRIATIVE POOL'S OPPOSITION TO THE MOTION BY THE OVERLYING (NON-AGRICULTURAL) POOL COMMITTEE FOR COURT REVIEW OF WATERMASTER ACTIONS PURSUANT TO SECTION 31 OF JUDGMENT
- 2) DECLARATION OF ROBERT A. DELOACH

/_x_/	BY MAIL: in said cause, by placing a true copy thereof enclosed with postage thereon fully prepaid, for delivery by United States Postal Service mail at Rancho Cucamonga, California, addresses as follows: See attached service list: Mailing List 1
//	BY PERSONAL SERVICE: I caused such envelope to be delivered by hand to the addressee.
<i></i> /	BY FACSIMILE: I transmitted said document by fax transmission from (909) 484-3890 to the fax number(s) indicated. The transmission was reported as complete on the transmission report, which was properly issued by the transmitting fax machine.
l_x_l	BY ELECTRONIC MAIL: I transmitted notice of availability of electronic documents by electronic transmission to the email address indicated. The transmission was reported as complete on the transmission report, which was properly issued by the transmitting electronic mail device.
I decla	re under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct.

Executed on April 19, 2010 in Rancho Cucamonga, California.

Janine Wilson

Chino Basin Watermaster

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